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Non-Technical Summary
Investment decisions of multinational companies are affected by international tax rate
differentials. Furthermore, multinationals have enhanced tax planning opportunities by
means of cross-country profit shifting. Until now only very few studies have combined
profit shifting activities and related investment effects. Therefore, this paper aims to
provide an empirical insight into the interaction between profit shifting activities and real
investment decisions. In particular, the question whether the size of multinationals’ real
investments at high-tax locations is affected by taxation of shifted profits is analyzed.
It can be expected that profit shifting activities lead to smaller tax payments and thus,
competitive advantages arise. A simple theoretical model which examines profit shifting
and investment decisions of a multinational company is used to obtain empirical implica-
tions. The theoretical analysis shows that tax rates abroad impact the cost of capital in the
presence of profit shifting activities. The respective size of investment should theoretically
increase with a decreasing tax rate at a foreign affiliate, towards which profits are shifted.
An empirical analysis is based on the MiDi database, a comprehensive micro-level panel
database of virtually all FDI projects in Germany, made available for research by the Ger-
man central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). A specific advantage for the empirical analysis
lies in the fact that, due to the high German tax level, profit distribution of foreign sub-
sidiaries is always tax exempt at the owner’s home country. Therefore, without profit
shifting a negative impact of higher taxation abroad on investment levels in Germany is
not expected. The empirical analysis, based on a panel of German inbound investments,
confirms a positive tax response of real investments with a decreasing tax rate at the foreign
direct investor’s location. Hence, the results suggest that the size of foreign investments in
a high-tax country is positively affected by lower taxation of shifted profits.
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Abstract: This paper investigates whether the size of multinationals’ real investments in
a high-tax country is affected by profit shifting activities. A simple theoretical analysis
shows that tax rates abroad impact the cost of capital in the presence of profit shifting
activities of multinational companies. As profit shifting opportunities constitute a compet-
itive advantage, the respective size of investments should theoretically increase if profits
can be shifted to a lower taxing country. An empirical analysis, based on a panel of German
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1 Introduction
International tax planning of multinational companies seems to be of great significance,
given the fact that international differences in business taxation are very distinct. Real
investment decisions in particular seem to be affected by international differences in busi-
ness taxation. Moreover, cross-country profit shifting activities of multinationals can be
expected. The latter are known for inducing consequences for tax revenues. Hence, govern-
ments attempt to restrict profit shifting opportunities. From a theoretical point of view,
however, adverse consequences for the level of investment in high-taxing countries can be
expected, which may also intensify tax-competition (see e.g. Keen, 2001; Peralta, Wauthy
and van Ypserle, 2006). Therefore, this paper aims to provide an empirical insight into the
interaction between profit shifting activities and real investment decisions. In particular,
the question whether the size of multinationals’ real investments in high-tax locations is
affected by taxation of shifted profits is analyzed.
Previous empirical literature confirms significant effects of company taxation on business
decisions. In particular, the effects of corporate taxation on multinationals’ foreign direct
investment decisions have been analyzed extensively. This literature confirms significant
negative effects of the host country’s tax level on the size and the frequency of FDI.1
Furthermore, there is strong evidence that, apart from real investment decisions, multina-
tionals’ behavior is affected by international taxation.2 This applies to cross-border shifting
of paper profits in particular, which is confirmed by previous empirical work. Several stud-
ies such as Altshuler and Grubert (2003) or Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) show that
financial structures are used as a profit shifting tool. Furthermore, there is evidence that
multinationals’ transfer pricing is also tax driven (Clausing 2003, 2006; Grubert, 2003).
1A comprehensive survey and meta analysis based on 25 previous studies is provided by De Mooij and
Ederveen (2003). This work has recently been updated by De Mooij and Ederveen (2005).
2Detailed surveys concerning empirical evidence on several aspects of companies’ international tax
planning behavior are provided by Hines (1999) and Devereux (2006).
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The success of such shifting strategies is confirmed by studies, which ascertain that the
reported profitability of multinationals’ affiliates is negatively affected by the level of the
local tax rate (See e.g. Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2007).
Until now only very few studies have combined profit shifting activities and related invest-
ment effects. Several studies focus on profit shifting activities and the related effects on the
size and probability of multinationals’ investments at typical tax havens. Hines and Rice
(1994), Grubert and Slemrod (1998) as well as Desai, Foley and Hines (2006) analyze the ef-
fects of profit shifting activities on US investments in tax havens. Thus, previous empirical
analysis provides evidence for significant profit shifting and also for significant investment
effects on affiliates, which are used as targets of shifted profits. However, empirical studies
dealing with the expected corresponding investment effects in high-tax countries are still
rare. Grubert (2003) finds that US multinationals with higher-than-average profit shifting
activities choose locations with extreme tax levels. These companies prefer locations in
countries, which exhibit either extremely low or extremely high tax levels. The preference
for tax-havens stems from the need for locations as tax shelter subsidiaries. By contrast, the
higher attractiveness of high-tax locations for multinationals can be explained by competi-
tive advantages as a result of profit shifting opportunities. With regard to investment levels
at existing locations of multinational groups, Buettner et al. (2006) confirm for German
multinationals negative effects of thin-capitalization rules, which constitute a restriction
on profit shifting by means of inter-company finance, on investment levels.
This paper aims to provide additional insight into the effects of profit shifting opportunities
on investment behavior of multinationals in a high-tax country. The analysis is focussed
on the effects of profit shifting on investment levels rather than on location decisions. A
simple theoretical analysis shows that tax rates abroad impact the cost of capital in the
presence of profit shifting activities of multinational companies. The respective size of
investment should theoretically increase with a decreasing tax rate at a foreign affiliate,
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towards which profits are shifted. The empirical analysis is based on the MiDi database, a
comprehensive micro-level panel database of virtually all FDI projects in Germany, made
available for research by the German central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). Germany as a
host country for FDI is of interest for several reasons. First of all, the German statutory
company tax rate is almost the highest in the world. Hence, there are high incentives to
shift profits out of Germany.3 Secondly, Germany is the biggest economy in Europe and an
important location for FDI, e.g. from the US. Finally, due to European directives, profit
shifting towards other European countries is not restricted by adverse withholding taxes.
A specific advantage for the empirical analysis lies in the fact that, due to the high German
tax level, profit distribution of foreign subsidiaries is always tax exempt at the owner’s
home country. Therefore, without profit shifting we would by no means expect a negative
impact of higher taxation at home on investment levels in Germany. However, in the
presence of profit shifting activities between a foreign owner and a German affiliate, a
negative effect of an increasing tax rate at the parent company’s location on the investment
level of the German affiliate can be expected. By using firm-level data, we can confirm
that a company’s investment level increases significantly with a decreasing tax rate of the
direct foreign owner. Hence, the results suggest that investments in a high-tax country are
significantly affected by a competitive advantage due to profit shifting activities.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, a theoretical model examines profit shifting
and investment decisions of a multinational corporation, from which empirical implications
are derived. Section 3 empirically tests the implication that investment levels are responsive
to tax rates in the owner’s country. Lastly, section 4 concludes.
3Germany’s tax revenues from company taxation are comparatively low (European Communities, 2005),
which can be taken as a hint that multinationals shift profits in practice.
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2 Theoretical Background
2.1 A Model of Profit Shifting and Investment
The impact of profit shifting activities and real investment decisions of a multinational
company can be described via a simple company model with only two locations. The
parent company is denoted by 1 and the controlled affiliate by 2. The affiliate’s profit, pi2,
is determined by output f2 (k2), whereas k2 is the amount of capital invested at the foreign
location. Typical characteristics of the production function are assumed as f2,k(k2) >
0 ; f2,kk(k2) < 0. We assume opportunity costs of capital, denoted by r. Furthermore, the
company can shift a share of the affiliate’s profit to the parent company’s location. In
practice, a multinational has several options for effecting this shift, for example, by means
of interest payments for internal loans or tax-optimal transfer prices for intra-firm sales.
It is reasonable to assume that the amount of profits shifted is related to the size of the
affiliate’s business activity, i.e. to the amount of invested capital.4 The shifting amount
per capital unit is denoted by λ2. The statutory tax rate of the affiliate’s location, t2,
is avoided by profit shifting activities. Correspondingly, the shifted amount is taxed by
the statutory tax rate at another location, for example, at the parent company location’s
statutory tax rate, t1.
5 Hence, the profit after taxes deviates by (t2 − t1)λ2k2.
Additionally, it is reasonable to consider some costs which depend on the level of intra-firm
profit shifting. The costs for inter-company loans, for instance, might arise from tax as
well as non-tax constraints, such as costs arising from asymmetric information and agency
4A commonly applied tool is, for example, internal debt shifting. In this case, λ represents the share
of intra-company-debt-to-assets multiplied with the interest rate paid for the internal credit.
5Withholding taxes on profit shifting are not considered. For example, the withholding taxes on interest
payments are typically low and can be credited against the lender’s corporate tax. However, in the case
of German data, which is used in the empirical analysis, no withholding taxes are imposed on interest
payments.
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costs (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). Furthermore, the risk increases that
interest deduction will no longer be approved for tax purposes. With regard to tax-optimal
transfer pricing of intra-firm deliveries, it is reasonable to assume that the probability of
punishment, tax advisory costs and economic inefficiencies rises with an increasing devia-
tion from the optimal transfer price before-taxes. The economic inefficiencies seem to be
of particular importance, since transfer prices and intra-firm markets are typically used as
instruments of a non-central coordination and incentive system for the local management
(see e.g. Baldenius et al., 2004). Hence, we assume a convex cost function, c2(λ2).
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There are several non-tax reasons to use transactions, which effect profit shifting between
affiliates. For example, inter-company debt is used for short-term cash management be-
tween parent and affiliate, or as an instrument to control the local management by fixed
annual interest payments (Jensen, 1986). Therefore, a concave utility function, g2(λ2), is
assumed.7
Thus, the following profit function for investments in the foreign affiliate can be obtained
pi2 = f2(k2)(1− t2)− k2r + [(t2 − t1)λ2 − c2(λ2) + g2(λ2)]k2. (1)
This profit function is relevant in the case of an exemption system for the repatriation of
foreign dividends. In this case, the tax level of the affiliate is final. This holds true for
investors from most European countries and Canada. By contrast, in the case of a tax
system based on a worldwide tax base like the US system, the foreign profits are taxed
by t1 at the parent’s location, when they are repatriated. Foreign taxes can be credited
against these tax payments. However, a credit system effectively becomes an exemption
system if the foreign tax level is higher than the tax level at home.8 With regard to
6 dc2
dλ2
> 0, d
2c2
dλ22
> 0.
7 dg2
dλ2
> 0, d
2g2
dλ22
< 0.
8It should be emphasized that an excess credit does not affect the tax-sensitivity of investments in
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our empirical analysis, based on foreign affiliates in Germany from 1996 until 2005, the
combined tax level consisting of the German company taxation and additional withholding
taxes on profit distribution is always higher than taxation at home.9
When considering equation (1), it becomes obvious that intra-firm profit shifting between
the foreign affiliate and the parent company affects after-tax profits. Hence, one would
expect the share of foreign profits that are shifted internally, λ2, and the amount of capital
invested at the foreign location, k2, to be responsive to tax rate differences. Thus, in order
to choose the optimum share of internally shifted profits, the following first-order condition
is obtained,
t2 − t1 + g2,λ(λ2) = c2,λ(λ2). (2)
When one takes the convex character of the cost function into account, the share of taxable
profit, which is shifted internally, increases with a rising tax rate differential, (t2 − t1).
Comparative static, which is shown in the appendix, points out that the optimal shifting
amount increases with a rising tax rate at the investment location, t2, and decreases with
an increasing tax rate at the owner’s location, t1, towards which the profit is shifted.
Additionally, for the optimum amount of capital invested by the affiliate 2, we obtain
f2,k(k2) =
r − [(t2 − t1)λ2 − c2(λ2) + g2(λ2)]
(1− t2) . (3)
The expression on the right hand side of equation (3) can be interpreted as the cost of
capital, i.e. as a required rate of return. A company’s management should invest as
much as the marginal capital productivity, f2,k(k2), matches this required rate of return.
countries, that procure an excess credit, but may affect the tax sensitivity of investment in other low-tax
countries.
9During the considered period from 1996 until 2005 the German tax rate ranges from 43.9% to 39.4
%. These rates are significantly higher than the US tax level, for instance, irrespective of any additional
withholding taxes on profit distribution between Germany and the US.
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Subsequently, taxes have the following consequences: First of all, a higher local tax rate,
t2, in the denominator induces a higher cost of capital. Thus, the size of invested capital is
reduced by a higher local tax rate at the investment location. Furthermore, the expression
in squared brackets of equation (3) shows the effect of profit shifting activities on the cost of
capital. Taking into account equation (2), the expression in squared brackets never becomes
negative since the management is able to optimize the cross-country profit allocation.
Hence, the cost of capital decreases if a company shifts taxable profits. For multinationals,
the advantage of a lower cost of capital due to profit shifting opportunities depends on both
the share of profits shifted and, in particular, on the level of the tax rates. Comparative
static in the appendix highlights that the shifted amount of profit increases and the cost
of capital decreases with a falling tax rate abroad. Thus, the optimal investment level
should increase with a decreasing tax rate at the foreign owner’s location, t1, if profits are
shifted there. Correspondingly, in the presence of profit shifting the negative effect of an
increasing tax rate at the investment location, t2, is smaller compared to cases without any
profit shift. This means that, unlike cases without profit shifting, another tax rate, e.g.
the tax rate of the corresponding parent company, becomes significant for the investment
level in a high-tax host country.
2.2 Losses
The incentive to shift profits changes if the actual profit is negative or if former losses are
carried forward. In this case, the immediate advantage of shifting any profit amount to
another affiliate does not exist. In the context of the model presented above, the value of
avoided taxes decreases significantly and tends to become zero if a loss set-off cannot be
expected in the future. However, empirical identification is limited since we cannot measure
profitability before profit shifting is effected in practice. Nevertheless, the presence of a
loss carryforward seems to be a suitable indicator for affiliates, which have a significantly
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smaller incentive to shift profits.10 In this case the actual profit for tax purposes becomes
zero irrespective of any profit shifting activities. Thus, as a result sensitivity of investment
levels concerning foreign tax rates decreases if an affiliate exhibit a loss carryforward.11
Therefore, affiliates in a high-tax country exhibiting a loss carryforward may constitute a
suitable control group for an empirical test on the effects of foreign tax rates due to profit
shifting on investment.
2.3 Interposed Entities
So far, we have considered a simple two-tier company structure. In practice, company
group structures are more complex. This also holds true for data used by the following
empirical analysis. Table 1, for example, shows the distribution among countries of direct
owners of German inbound investments, which are ultimately held by US parent companies
in 2005. Additionally, Table 1 denotes that, in 2005 for example, only 62.5 per cent of US
controlled affiliates in Germany are directly held by US companies. Approximately 14 per
cent are indirectly held via interposed companies, which are located in the Netherlands.
Moreover, Luxembourg and Switzerland are important locations for interposed entities
although they are comparably small countries, whereas the United Kingdom and France
are big European economies which also have significant numbers of conduit entities. If
fractions are considered, which are weighted by investment stocks in fixed assets, only 44
per cent of US controlled FDI in Germany are held directly by US companies.
A number of possible management reasons might render it necessary to organize business
activities in functional divisions or regional structures. Furthermore, tax reasons are im-
10Considerably reduced tax sensitivities of companies exhibiting a loss carryforward with regard to
financial decisions and with regard to transfer pricing are empirically confirmed by e.g. MacKie-Mason
(1990) and Overesch (2006), respectively.
11See e.g. Edgerton (2007), who find a significantly reduced tax response of US companies’ investment
if companies exhibit a loss carryforward.
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Table 1: US controlled FDI in Germany in 2005
Affiliates Fixed Assets
Location of
Direct Owner Number of Percent Mean per Obser- Percent
Observations vation (e 1,000 )
USA 513 62.48 5,649 44.14
Belgium 10 1.22 2,550 0.39
France 22 2.68 20,698 6.94
Denmark 15 1.83 5,888 1.35
Ireland 6 0.73 1,908 0.17
Luxembourg 45 5.48 5,598 3.84
Netherlands 117 14.25 19,738 35.16
Spain 11 1.34 9,305 1.56
Sweden 7 0.85 1,322 0.14
Switzerland 17 2.07 19,687 5.10
United Kingdom 44 5.36 1,730 1.16
Other Countries 10 1.22 375 0.05
Total 821 100.00 7,998 100.00
Singly incorporated affiliates in Germany in 2005 are considered whose majority is owned by a US parent
company either directly or via a conduit entity. The data is taken from the MiDi database for multina-
tionals provided by the German central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). This is a comprehensive annual
micro database of all foreign direct investment positions in Germany. See Lipponer (2006) for a detailed
description of the data set. Other countries are Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Hongkong, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands Antilles, and Slovakia.
portant determinants of group structures and chains of ownership. Firstly, withholding
taxes on repatriated profits can be reduced if an entity, which is located in a country
offering favorable tax treaties, is interposed between parent company and affiliate. This
so-called treaty-shopping strategy might explain the existence of some of the conduit com-
panies in the Netherlands or the United Kingdom.12 Secondly, interposed entities can be
used to defer taxation of repatriated foreign income if the parent company’s country taxes
corporations on a worldwide tax base.13
12No withholding tax is imposed on profit distribution from the Netherlands or the United Kingdom into
the United States. Withholding taxes on dividend distribution between companies within the European
Union have also been abolished. By contrast, the withholding tax rate on a direct dividend distribution
from a German affiliate to a US parent company amounts to 5%.
13The relevance of this strategy to avoid or defer repatriation taxes is empirically confirmed by Altshuler
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However, irrespective of any other reasons for setting up interposed entities, they can
always be used as a shelter of profit shifting activities. Subsequently, shifted profits are
taxed at the tax rate of the interposed entity.14 For example, financial structures using
an conduit entity can be used to achieve a double dip of interest deductions at the parent
company and the investment affiliate (Mintz, 2004). An equity financed entity, which is
lending an inter-company loan to the high-taxed investment affiliate, is interposed in a
low-tax country. The proposition that conduit entities are set up as profit-shifting shelters
is indirectly confirmed by previous empirical work, which has found an increasing business
activity in tax havens (Grubert and Slemrod, 1998; Desai, Foley and Hines, 2006). Given
that the advantage of profit shifting is not restricted to affiliates in typical tax havens, the
following analysis considers interposed entities in 40 countries, mostly located in OECD
and EU countries.
Finally, opportunities to take advantage of a lower foreign tax level by shifting profits may
not be restricted to the parent company or conduit entities. Nevertheless, they seem to
be of special relevance when considering the number of financial and business transactions
between directly affiliated companies. We will restrict our empirical analysis on the tax
rates of the foreign direct owners of German inbound investments, i.e. on parent companies
or, respectively, interposed entities, because information about the group structure in our
data set is limited.
and Grubert (2003) as well as by Desai, Foley and Hines (2003).
14This argument resembles to that of Altshuler and Grubert (2003), who discovered that US multina-
tionals use foreign companies at low-tax locations in order to retain foreign profits, which are taxed at a
level below the US tax rate. By means of this strategy, the higher US taxation can be deferred. Whereas
a strategy to avoid repatriation taxes might be of little importance considering the comparably high tax
level in Germany, conduit entities can be used to shift profits from a high-tax country such as Germany
into a lower taxed conduit entity. Consequently the high German tax level is avoided and the US tax level
is at least deferred.
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3 Empirical Analysis
The theoretical discussion shows that in the presence of profit shifting activities, foreign tax
rates have increasing importance for investment decisions. Considering the vast amount
of empirical evidence on profit shifting activities of multinationals, our empirical analysis
focusses on the investment effects related to these profit shifting activities. The following
empirical analysis aims at identifying the expected negative effect of an increasing foreign
tax rate at the direct owner’s location on the investment level in a high-taxing host country,
namely Germany.
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis uses theMiDi database for multinationals, provided by the German
central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). This is a comprehensive annual micro database of di-
rect investment positions of German enterprizes held abroad as well as of direct investment
positions held in Germany by foreign companies. However, this analysis is only based on
the data of German inbound FDI positions. The data provides annual information on the
investment object’s balance sheet, including further information on the type of investment
and on the foreign investor.15 The collection of the data is enforced by the German law,
which set out reporting obligations for certain international transactions and positions.16
Access to the data is only permitted if no confidential single data is published. A favor-
able characteristic of the data set is the possibility to trace direct investment positions of
15See Lipponer (2006) for a detailed description of the data set.
16Sec. 26 Law on Foreign Trade and Payments (Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz ) in connection with Foreign
Trade and Payment Regulations (Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung). Every German affiliate held by a foreign
multinational has to report its assets, including both direct FDI and indirect FDI conditional on certain
threshold levels. Since 2002, inbound FDI has to be reported, if the balance sheet total of the investment
object surpasses 3 million euros. For details see Lipponer (2006). Despite lower threshold levels in previous
years, we apply this higher threshold level uniformly for all years in the panel.
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individual firms over time. Due to the panel data structure it is possible to control for
heterogeneity across companies. The version used provides firm-level panel data for the
period of 1996 to 2005.
Table 2 shows the home country apportionment of the German inbound FDI data. Only
incorporated inbound investments are taken into account if the ultimate parent company is
located in a member state of the OECD or the European Union. Important home countries
of ultimate owners are Germany’s neighboring countries such as France, the Netherlands,
Austria or Switzerland. Furthermore, a high number of investments is held by companies
from big economies such as Japan, Canada and, of course, the US. During the period of
1996 until 2005, more than 20 per cent of the considered foreign affiliates in Germany
were affiliates of US companies. Due to interposed companies, the apportionment of the
direct owners’ locations is different. Table 2 reveals that the Netherlands and Switzerland
become more important as a location for direct owners. Correspondingly, the shares of
direct owners, for example, from Japan or the United States decrease in comparison to the
respective shares of ultimate owners from these countries.
Since the model deals with an enterprize optimizing the real investment of its affiliate, only
observations displaying a participation level above 50 per cent are taken into account for
the empirical analysis. We employ fixed assets of each affiliate as the dependent variable.
The empirical analysis is based on a sample, to which only firm observations are included
which display positive real investment levels in fixed assets for each year. The sample
is limited to first-tier incorporated affiliates in Germany, because we will focus on effects
caused by profit shifting between affiliates in Germany and their foreign direct owners.
The direct owner’s foreign statutory tax rate is denoted by the variable STR. The foreign
statutory tax rate represents the incentive to shift profits if an affiliate does not exhibit
any loss carryforward or any current losses for tax purposes. This means that if affiliates
12
Table 2: FDI in Germany 1996 - 2005
Ultimate Home Country Direct Owner’s Country
Number Percent Number Percent
Australia 129 0.31 58 0.14
Austria 2,037 4.96 2,165 5.27
Belgium 897 2.18 1,081 2.63
Bulgaria 23 0.06 23 0.06
Canada 466 1.13 315 0.77
Cyprus 18 0.04 32 0.08
Czech Republic 71 0.17 80 0.19
Denmark 1,247 3.03 1,399 3.40
Finland 484 1.18 398 0.97
France 3,482 8.47 3,555 8.65
Germany 359 0.87 0 0.00
Greece 50 0.12 50 0.12
Hungary 37 0.09 41 0.10
Iceland 25 0.06 22 0.05
Ireland 154 0.37 174 0.42
Italy 1,579 3.84 1,321 3.21
Japan 3,733 9.08 2,939 7.15
Luxembourg 947 2.30 1,358 3.30
Mexico 4 0.01 0 0.00
Netherlands 5,074 12.35 7,945 19.33
New Zealand 11 0.03 0 0.00
Norway 373 0.91 342 0.83
Poland 37 0.09 41 0.10
Portugal 57 0.14 34 0.08
Romania 8 0.02 8 0.02
Slovakia 14 0.03 18 0.04
Slovenia 91 0.22 85 0.21
South Korea 314 0.76 305 0.74
Spain 407 0.99 485 1.18
Sweden 1,256 3.06 1,242 3.02
Switzerland 5,092 12.39 5,266 12.81
Turkey 186 0.45 174 0.42
United Kingdom 3,674 8.94 3,333 8.11
USA 8,763 21.32 6,762 16.45
Other Countriesa) 7 0.02 55 0.13
Total 41,106 100.00 41,106 100.00
a)Brasilia, Hongkong, Indonesia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Singapore.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev.
Firm level variables
Fixed Assets stocks in e thousand 10,878 80,095
LCF indicator of loss carryforward in the previous year .418 .493
NLCF indicator of no loss carryforward in the previous year .582 .493
Tax variable
STR foreign direct owner’s statutory tax rate .346 .068
Further characteristics
Exchange Rate foreign currency of the ultimate owner’s location per e 30.6 135
GDP of ultimate owner’s home country in billion US dollars 2,392 3,459
24,487 observations of foreign controlled FDI in Germany from 1997 until 2005. The first period
is always not considered due to the lagged indicator of a loss carryforward. Firm level variables
are taken from the MiDi database, a comprehensive data set of all foreign direct investment
in Germany. See Lipponer (2006) for a more detailed description. The statutory tax rate is
collected from various sources such as surveys provided by the International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation (IBFD) and KPMG, PwC and Ernst&Young. Exchange rates are taken from
Reuters Financial and the GDP is from World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
exhibit a loss carryforward, the sensitivity to foreign tax rates should be reduced. For
this reason, a dummy variable LCF is used as an indicator for the possibility of offsetting
former losses with actual profits taking on the value one, while otherwise zero.
Investment levels of foreign affiliates in Germany may also be affected by the track of the
bilateral exchange rate between the parent company’s local currency and the local currency
at the investment location (see e.g. Froot and Stein, 1991). Therefore, we use annual
averages of the daily exchange rate between the parent company’s local currency and the
Euro. In additional robustness checks the GDP of the parent companies’ home country
is employed. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the data used by the regressions,
including 24,487 German inbound observations during the period of 1997 until 2005.
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3.2 Investigation Approach
Basically, the theoretical discussion presented above provides a testable relationship be-
tween the investment levels of multinationals in a high tax country and the foreign tax
rate of a company, which is used as a shelter for profit shifting. Considering the typically
high number of transactions it seems to be fairly appropriate to focus on the relation-
ship between a subsidiary and its direct owner.17 For the empirical analysis, firm-level
data of foreign inbound investments in Germany are used, which are taken from the MiDi
database. This means that the considered investments take place in the same country, i.e.
in Germany. A resulting advantage for the empirical analysis lies in the fact that all loca-
tion specific characteristics are equal for all considered objects. Since we have information
about the location of the direct foreign owner, we focus on the tax effects of profit shifting
between the foreign direct owner and the German affiliate. Then, the following estimation
equation can be set up to estimate the effect of a higher foreign statutory tax rate, STRj,
of the direct owner j on the investment level of affiliate i in Germany in year t.
ln(FixedAssetsi,j,k,l,t) = α0+α1STRj,t+α2ln(ExchangeRate)i,k,t+α3LCFi,t
+ αi + αk + αl + αt + i,j,k,l,t. (4)
As dependent variable we use the natural log of fixed assets as a measure of real investment
level. Here αi denotes an affiliate specific fixed effect used to control for firm specific
unobserved effects. A country fixed effect of the ultimate parent company’s location, αk,
is introduced to control for effects such as distance between the parent company’s location
and Germany. Furthermore, if an interposed entity is used, an additional country fixed
effect, αl, of that additional location is considered.
17It is possible that other affiliates exist within a multinational group, which can be used to shift profits.
Due to data limitation, we focus on the effect of a higher direct owner’s tax rate on investment levels
of foreign affiliates in Germany. Hence, we may underestimate the total tax effects of profit shifting on
multinational investments in Germany.
15
Since all investments are located in Germany, unobserved characteristics such as the local
market size, labor costs, and regulations are equal for all considered investment objects.
The German tax law, in particular, is equal for all considered investment objects. Further-
more, different conditions in different years are controlled for by using time fixed effects,
αt. Since the German tax level was very high during the considered period from 1997 until
2005, all repatriated profits were effectively exempt from taxation at the parent company.
Theoretical analysis shows that in this case a negative impact of the home country tax level
on investment can be expected only if shifted profits are taxed there. Hence, in accordance
with our theoretical analysis, a negative sign can be expected for α1.
As in previous studies focussing on tax effects on inbound investments (e.g. Slemrod, 1990;
Swenson, 1994; Cassou, 1997), the natural log of the exchange rate between the ultimate
parent company’s local currency and the Euro is considered. Firm specific characteristics
may impact investment decisions. In particular profitability seems to be important. For
this reason, we introduce a dummy variable LCF indicating affiliates exhibiting a loss
carryforward. This dummy variable is used as an indicator for bad performance in previous
years. It can be expected that this leads to smaller investment levels. Correspondingly,
a dummy variable NLCF which indicates subsidiaries exhibiting no loss carryforward is
introduced.
As discussed before, it can be expected that the incentive to shift profits, and thus, the tax
sensitivity of investments is reduced if an affiliate can immediately set off actual earnings
with losses carried forward. Hence, affiliates exhibiting a loss carryforward may constitute
a suitable control group. For this reason, in a second set of estimations an interaction
term between the foreign tax rate and the dummy variable LCF is used to identify the
expected difference in tax sensitivity of that group. Since we expect a negative sign for α1, a
positive sign for the interaction between LCF and STR indicates a smaller tax sensitivity of
investment levels with respect to the foreign tax rate in the presence of a loss carryforward.
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3.3 Regression Results
The empirical analysis is based on the estimation equation (4). As dependent variable
the natural log of fixed assets is used. Table 4 shows the respective regression results.
According to the theoretical model, a negative impact of the direct owner’s statutory tax
rate at home on the investment level in Germany can be confirmed. The results suggest
a negative investment effect due to increasing tax rates on shifted profits. That means a
higher taxation of shifted profits abroad has a negative impact on investment decisions at
the high-tax location Germany. With regard to control variables, a negative impact of a
more expensive Euro on investment levels in Germany is confirmed. Subsidiaries exhibiting
a loss carryforward show significantly smaller investment levels. The lower investment levels
of loss carrying affiliates should not be as surprising, since the dummy variable LCF also
reflects past business performance of an affiliate. This might be a suitable indicator for
expectations of future profitability.
In column (2) an interaction between the LCF dummy variable and the direct owner’s
statutory tax rate is introduced. This interaction term is likely to control for a different
tax sensitivity if affiliates exhibit a loss carryforward. The empirical results confirm a
significantly lower tax sensitivity for loss carrying affiliates. Moreover, in column (3) a
corresponding dummy variable NLCF indicating affiliates without a loss carryforward is
interacted with the statutory tax rate. This specification shows that loss carrying sub-
sidiaries are also, to some extent, sensitive to tax rates abroad. A lower tax sensitivity
of about -.869 is estimated for loss carrying subsidiaries, while a significantly negative
semi-elasticity of affiliate’s fixed assets with regard to the foreign tax rate of about -1.33
is estimated for affiliates without a loss carryforward.
Additional robustness checks are carried out in accordance with gravity models explaining
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Table 4: Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
STR -1.13∗∗ -1.33∗∗ -1.21∗∗ -1.01∗∗ -.854∗∗
(.428) (.427) (.379) (.342) (.401)
STR x NLCF -1.33∗∗ -1.21∗∗
(.427) (.379)
STR x LCF .463∗ -.869∗ .502∗∗ -.712∗ .525∗∗ .413∗
(.246) (.469) (.244) (.404) (.211) (.242)
ln(Exchange Rate) -.127∗∗ -.130∗∗ -.130∗∗ -.308∗∗ -.308∗∗ -.509∗∗ -.265∗∗
(.060) (.060) (.060) (.075) (.075) (.097) (.067)
LCF -.078∗∗ -.239∗∗ -.239∗∗ -.251∗∗ -.251∗∗ -.259∗∗ -.246∗∗
(.017) (.086) (.086) (.086) (.086) (.072) (.087)
ln(GDP) -.471∗∗ -.471∗∗ -.543∗∗ -.473∗∗
(.125) (.125) (.123) (.126)
Adj. R2 .899 .900 .900 .900 .900 .918 .905
Observations 24,487 24,487 24,487 24,487 24,487 22,126 20,698
Dependent variable is ln(Fixed Assets). Columns (6) and (7) are based on subsamples, where all
observations from the financial sector or all affiliates held via a conduit entity, respectively, are
excluded. Standard errors are in parentheses, which are clustered within year-country cells and
robust against random firm-specific and country effects using the Huber-White sandwich formula.
A star denotes significance at the 10% level and two stars at the 5% level. All estimates include
a full set of firm, time and country fixed effects.
FDI.18 In columns (4) and (5) the GDP of the parent company’s country is introduced.
The negative effect of the size of the home country’s GDP suggests that the more the home
market grows, the less incentives arise to invest abroad. However, the estimated tax effects
seem to be fairly unaffected.
Furthermore, additional results are presented which are based on subsamples. Firstly,
the regression shown in column (6) is based on a subsample where all affiliates from the
financial sector are excluded. In column (7) only affiliates are considered which are not held
18In the context of tax effects on FDI, gravity model specifications are employed, for example, by Mutti
and Grubert (2004). Note that the size of the host country’s GDP, however, is controlled for by the time
fixed effects, because all considered subsidiaries are located in the same country, namely Germany.
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via an interposed entity located in a country other than the parent company’s location.
That means we focus exclusively on the tax effect of the parent company. However, the
estimated tax sensitivities are robust.
Until now only very few studies consider the level of the investor’s home country tax rate
in addition to the host country’s tax rate (Slemrod, 1990; Cassou, 1997; Egger et al.,
2006; Wijeweera et al., 2007). These studies find positive or insignificant effects of the
investor’s home country tax rate on investments in foreign host countries. By contrast, our
empirical analysis identifies a negative tax sensitivity with regard to the home country’s
tax rate. At first glance, our results oppose to the above-mentioned studies. However,
this is not necessary a real contradiction. Previous results are based on data of investors
stemming from countries with smaller but also higher tax rates than the host country tax
level. Furthermore, these results are based on aggregated data. Hence, different tax effects
stemming from host country taxation and adverse tax effects of profit shifting opportunities
are measured together. By contrast, our analysis is exclusively based on data of investment
levels of foreign affiliates in one specific extremely high-tax country, Germany. In the case of
a very high tax level in a host country, profit shifting becomes more important. Moreover,
our data consists of investment levels of foreign affiliates, for which location decisions in
favor of Germany have already been made. Thus, our empirical analysis is more exclusively
focused on the investment-size effects due to profit shifting activities, while previous studies
based on aggregated data are likely to estimate total tax effects due to several underlying
mechanisms.
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4 Conclusion
The theoretical analysis shows that the foreign tax level of a foreign entity used as a shelter
of shifted profits becomes important for investment decisions in a high-tax host country.
Then, it can be expected that the investment level in the high-tax host country decreases
with an increasing tax rate at a shelter location abroad. This proposition is confirmed by
our empirical analysis. By using firm-level data of German inbound investments, we find
a significantly negative effect of the direct foreign owner’s tax rate on the investment level
in Germany. Since repatriated profits from Germany are always effectively tax exempt,
considering the very high German tax level, our results suggest that investment decisions
are significantly affected by the level of taxation of shifted profit.
We can conclude that multinationals generate significant competitive advantages by means
of shifting profits if the parent company is located in a lower taxing home country. Fur-
thermore, our analysis shows that advantages are also evident if an interposed company in
a lower taxing country is used. It can be assumed that similar advantages can be generated
by using other affiliated companies as profit shifting shelters. Hence, we may underesti-
mate the total effect of profit shifting activities on real investment decisions. However, the
estimated magnitudes suggest that effects due to taxation of shifted profits on investments
in a high-tax host country are important. The competitive advantage due to enhanced
tax planning opportunities of multinational companies may affect, in particular, the com-
petition with purely national companies. Since our data set is restricted to affiliates of
multinational companies, this must remain a topic for further research.
The results lead to interesting implications for tax policy and its effects on multinationals’
investment decisions. Tax rate cuts in a country need not necessarily induce negative
effects on multinationals’ investment activities in other countries. In particular, a positive
effect on FDI in high-tax countries can be expected, to a certain extent, if significant
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profit shifting activities exist between the tax cutting country and the other high-tax
countries such as Germany or the US. Furthermore, from a high-tax country’s point of
view the negative effect of the own tax rate is mitigated by actual profit shifting activities
of multinational companies. Against this background, anti-avoidance legislation set up to
restrict profit shifting opportunities and to protect tax revenues may constitute significant
negative investment effects.
Datasources and Definitions
Firm-level data are taken from theMiDi dataset of the Bundesbank, see Lipponer (2006)
for an overview.
GDP in US dollars, nominal, taken from World Bank World Development Indicators
(2006).
Exchange rates are annual average spot rates, which are taken from Reuters Financial.
Statutory tax rates are taken from databases provided by the International Bureau of
Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) and from tax surveys provided by Ernst&Young, PwC and
KPMG.
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Appendix
Comparative Static
The following comparative static properties are derived by differentiating the first-order
conditions (2) and (3). Thus, we obtain
dt2−dt1 = [c2,λλ(λ2)−g2,λλ(λ2)]dλ2, (A-1)
(1−t2)f2,kk(k2)dk2−f2,k(k2)dt2 = λ2dt1−λ2dt2−[t2−t1−c2,λ(λ2)+g2,λ(λ2)]dλ2.(A-2)
We assume that a country does not immediately react on tax reforms in another country,
e.g. dt2
dt1
= 0With regard to the share of profits shifted, we obtain for the effects of increasing
tax rates
dλ2
dt1
= − 1
c2,λλ(λ2)−g2,λλ(λ2) < 0, (A-3)
dλ2
dt2
=
1
c2,λλ(λ2)−g2,λλ(λ2) > 0. (A-4)
With regard to the optimal investment size, we obtain
dk2
dt1
=
λ2−[t2−t1−c2,λ(λ2)+g2,λ(λ2)]dλ2dt1
(1−t2)f2,kk(k2) < 0, (A-5)
dk2
dt2
=
f2,k(k2)−λ2−[t2−t1−c2,λ(λ2)+g2,λ(λ2)]dλ2dt2
(1−t2)f2,kk(k2) ≷ 0. (A-6)
However, without profit shifting activities the effect of the foreign tax rate on investment,
dk2
dt1
, would equal zero. With regard to the effect of the host taxation, we would obtain
dk2
dt2
=
f2,k(k2)
(1−t2)f2,kk(k2) < 0. (A-7)
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